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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

DEEDs-Co-TENANCY-CoNVEYANCE BY GRANTOR To HrMsELF AND

WIFE-Decedent executed a deed conveying to himself and wife "as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common with the right of survivorship." After decedent's
death, the surviving spouse, plaintiff in this action for specific performance, entered into a contract to sell the land described in the conveyance to defendants
who declined to accept a deed from the plaintiff. Defense, that the conveyance
executed by decedent did not create a joint tenancy, therefore plaintiff did not
have full title to convey. H;ld, the deed created a joint tenancy with the right
of survivorship in the wife, the surviving wife acquiring full ownership on her
husband's death. Switzerv. Pratt, (Iowa 1946) 23 N.W. (2d) 837.
The principal case graphically illustrates two facets of the problem which the
conveyancer faces when he seeks to create a joint tenancy: (r), the mode of
conveyance requisite to pass the interest he has sought to carve out, and ( 2), the
language he as a draughtsman is compelled to use to create the kind of legal
interest desired. Despite the result in the instant case, it is submitted that the
conveyancer failed to solve satisfactorily the first part of the problem, as the
execution of the deed resulted in litigation. 1 At common law, a conveyance by
the grantor to himself and another in an attempt to create a joint tenancy would
fail, on the theory that since a grantor could not convey to himself, his title
could not be said to have been acquired at the same time with that of the other
· grantee, the sine qua non of an estate in joint tenancy being the simultaneous
conjunction of the four essential unities of time, title, interest and possession. 2
Also, under the facts of the principal case, further difficulty would be added
due to the doctrine of the common law that a husband could not convey to his
wife. 3 The difficulty in conveying to one's wife has now been largely eliminated
by statutes which specifically sanction such a conveyance, but the first obstacle is
still a formidable one. If the traditional assumption is made that a grantor cannot convey to himself, then the instant decision is in the face of the still present

1 The orthodox procedure used by lawyers in handling this kind of transaction, is
to have the grantor first convey to a "trusted friend" who in turn deeds it to the original grantor and the other person who is desired_ to be the co-tenant or joint grantee.
2 See 1 BLAcKsT, CoMM., Cooley and Andrews 4th ed., bk. 2, pp. I 80, I 8 I
(1899).
8.See for example McCord v. Bright, 44 Ind. App. 275, 87-N.E. 654 (1909).
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conceptual notion underlying an estate by joint tenancy that the title of all joint
tenants must be acquired simultaneously and from the same instrument. 4 Thus,
very few American courts have held clearly, without the aid of statute, that a
grantor may create directly a joint tena_ncy in himself and another. 5 Professor
Burby suggests that in the jurisdictions which recognize that a joint tenancy may
be thus created the unities of time and title are not essential to the creation of a
joint tenancy. 6 Surely the decision of the Iowa court in disregarding, without
the aid of statute, 7 the seemingly insuperable objection in one person being both
the grantor and grantee in the same deed is commendable. If violence is done by
the decision to what may have been a desirable property concept in Coke's England, certainly accommodation is made by the application of the principle that
courts should effectuate the intent of the parties so that their acts shall have the
legal significance intended. As to the equally important question as to what kind
of language the draughtsman, in seeking to create a joint tenancy, must choose
and use so that it will be appropriate to the creation of the intended estate in the
conveyees, the language used in the deed in the principal case-"as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common with the right of survivorship" 8-would seem to
4
See 4 THOMPSON, CoMMENTARIEs ON THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, § 1776
(1939).
5
The authorities are adequately discussed in Deslauriers v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437,
163 N.E. 327 (1928), 62 A.L.R. 514 (1929); Stuehm v. Mikulski, 139 Neb. 374,
297 N.W. 595 (1941).
6
BuRBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 290 (1943). See also the
remarks of Kennison, J. in a recent New Hampshire decision. Therrien v. Therrien,
(N.H. 1946) 46 A. {2d) 538, which is a square holding in accord with the principal
case and which definitely places New Hampshire among those jurisdictions which do
not require the four unities in the creation of joint estates.
7
See the Uniform lnterparty Agreement Act, 9 U.L.A. 426 (1942), adopted in
Maryland, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Utah, which was designed to cover problems as
exemplified by the facts of the principal case. It provides in § l that "a conveyance,
release or sale may be made to or by two or more persons acting jointly and one or more,
but less than all, of these persons acting either by himself or themselves or with other
persons; and a contract may be made between such parties." [See note 5, ArGLER,
BIGELOW AND PowELL, CASES ON PROPERTY 252 (1942) ]. But see In re Walker's
Estate, 340 Pa. 13, 16 A. (2d) 28 (1940), decided under the Uniform Act as adopted in
Pennsylvania.
8
See 37 MrcH. L. REv. 1318 at 1319 (1939) suggesting as a formula "as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common." Confusion exists in the cases as to what language
in face of the statutory presumption will be considered sufficient to create a joint tenancy. See Albright v. Winey, 226 Iowa 222, 284 N.W. 86 (1939), where the Iowa
court held that the language in a conveyance which stated to the grantees "jointly," did
not create a joint tenancy. See Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208, l 53 N.E. 827
( I 926), where a conveyance to two as "joint tenants" was held to create a joint tenancy. Compare Weber v. Nedin, 210 Wis. 39, 242 N.W. 487, 246 N.W. 307, 686
(1933), with Mustain v. Gardner, 203 111. 284, 67 N.E. 779 (1903). See also Shipley v. Shipley, 324 Ill. 560, 155 N.E. 334 (1927). For a case holding that a joint
tenancy may be created without declaring that the conveyees shall take as joint tenants,
see Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). See Hass v. Hass, 248
Wis. 212, 21 N.W. (2d) 398, 22 N.W. (2d) 151 (1946), where the Wisconsin
court, bound by precedent that one cannot convey to himself and another, held that the
language of the conveyance "as joint tenants during their joint lives and an absolute
fee forever in the remainder to the survivor of them," created a tenancy in common
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be an adequate formula .to avoid the presumption of the common statutory provision 9 that a conveyance to two or more shall be deemed to create a tenancy in
common, unless the contrary intention is clearly expressed in the conveying instrumen'.t.10
'
_
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for the lives of both followed by a vested remainder in the survivor; noted in 44 MICH.
L. REv. l 144 ( l 946). While the right of survivorship in a joint tenancy is not regarded as a future interest, see 2 SIMES, FunrRE INTERESTS, § 369 (1<>36) as to the
relationship of the joint interest in a class gift with that of co-tenancy.
9 For classification of American statutes on the subject, see BREWSTER, CONVEYANCING,§ 151 (1904). The applicable Iowa statute in Iowa Code (1946) §557.15
which provides that conveyances to two or more persons in their own right create a
tenancy in common, unless a contrary intent is expressed.
10 As the conveyance was one to husband and wife, the question is naturally raise'd
as to why a tenancy by the entireties was.not created. While a tenancy by the entireties
is not recognized in Iowa [see Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869) ], yet surely
such language in a deed executed in -jurisdictions which recognize tenancies by the
entireties is clear enough to defeat any presumption favoring the creation of that estate.
See 2 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 221 (1939). But as to
whether sue~ action by the granter husband in conveying to himself and his wife is
compatible with the fact that the tenancy by the entireties is based on the concept that
the h_usband and wife are one, compare Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E.
616 (1929), with what is submitted to be a more rational result in In re Estate of Mary
· Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 A. 898 (1932). See also Boehringer v. Schmid,
254 N.Y. 355, 173 N.E. 220 (1930).
·
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